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Ohio Rule 404(A) governs the circumstantial use of char-
acter evidence, i.e., the admissibility of evidence of a char-
acter trait to prove that a person acted in conformity with 
that trait on a particular occasion (character-as-proof-of-
conduct). 
This use of character is sometimes referred to as 
"propensity'' or "disposition" evidence. See State v. Curry, 43 
Ohio St2d 66, 68, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975) ("propensity or in-
clination to commit crime"); State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St2d 
167, 174,249 N.E:2d 912 (1969) (common law prohibited 
prior conduct evidence if offered "merely" to show "a trait, 
disposition or propensity toward the commission of crime"). 
For example, a person's character for honesty may be cir-
cumstantially relevant to a theft charge because it could be 
argued that a person with an honest character tends to act 
in conformity with that character and thus would be less like-
ly to steal. Similarly, it could be argued that a dishonest per-
son tends to act in conformity with that character and thus is 
more likely to steal. 
Both Rule 404(A) and Rule 404(B) prohibit the circum-
stantial use of character evidence. 
Exceptions. Many of the problems inherent in the use of 
character disappear, or at least diminish, when an accused 
offers evidence of her own character or that of a victim. 
Accordingly, Rule 404(A) recognizes three exceptions: (1) a 
criminal defendant's character, (2) a victim's character, and 
(3) a witness's character. With exceptions (1) and (2), it is 
the accused's or victim's character at the time of the 
charged offense that is relevant In contrast, exception (3) 
involves a witness's character at the time of trial. In prose-
cutions for rape or gross sexual imposition the Ohio rape 
shield law, and not Rule 404(A), controls. 
Methods of proof. Rule 404(A) specifies the conditions 
under which character evidence is admissible. The rule 
does not specify the methods of proof that may be used to 
establish character. Rule 405(A) governs the methods of 
proof. Generally, only opinion and reputation evidence (not 
specific acts) are permitted to prove character. 
Other-acts evidence. Rule 404(B) provides that evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, although not admis-
sible to prove character, may be admissible for some other 
purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepa-
ration, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident This subject will be discussed in the next issue. 
POLICY PROHIBITING CHARACTER & 
OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE 
Although character evidence may be probative in some 
cases, it is generally excluded because it "usually is laden 
with the dangerous baggage of prejudice, distraction, and 
time-consumption:' 1 McCormick, Evidence§ 188, at 654 
(5th ed. 1999). See also Michelson v. United States, 335 
US 469, 4 75-76 (1948) ("The inquiry is not rejected be-
cause character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to 
weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them 
as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him 
a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge."); 
Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892) (Prior rob-
beries "only tended to prejudice the defendants with the ju-
rors, to draw their minds away from the real issue, and to 
produce the impression that they were wretches whose lives 
were of no value to the community."). 
The Ohio cases are in accord. In State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio 
St2d 391, 402, 358 N.E.2d 623 (1976), vacated on other 
grounds by 438 U.S. 910 (1978), the Ohio Supreme Court 
commented: "Although character is not irrelevant, the dan-
ger of prejudice outweighs the probative value of such evi-
dence." See also State v. Mann, 19 Ohio St.3d 34, 37, 482 
N.E.2d 592 (1985) ("[T]he state was impermissibly allowed 
to show that appellant had a propensity to commit crimes, 
i.e., to infer from the fact that he had previously violated a 
civil injunction that he had likewise committed the crime 
charged [resisting arrest]."). 
In State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 68, 330 N.E.2d 720 
(1975)(quoting Whitty v. State, 34 Wis.2d 278, 149 N.W.2d 
557 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968), the Court 
identified the following dangers associated with character 
evidence: 
(1) The overstrong tendency to believe the defendant 
guilty of the charge merely because he is a person likely 
to do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn not be-
cause he is believed guilty of the present charge but be-
cause he has escaped punishment from other offenses; 
(3) the injustice of attacking one who is not prepared to 
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demonstrate the attacking evidence is fabricated; and (4) 
the confusion of issues which might result from bringing 
in evidence of other crimes. 
These dangers have crystallized into a general prohibi-
tion against the use of character evidence: "A hallmark of. 
the American criminal justice system is the principle that 
proof that the accused committed a crime other than the 
one for which he is on trial is not admissible when its sole 
· purpose is to show the accused's propensity or inclination to 
commit crime." State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 68, 330 
N.E.2d 720 (1975). See also State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio 
St.3d 182, 184, 552 N.E.2d 180 (1990) ("Under longstand-
ing principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence, an accused 
can not be convicted of one crime by proving he committed 
other crimes or is a bad person."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
881 (1990). 
The accused's character may be improperly introduced in 
a variety of ways: 
Mug shots. E.g., State v. Breedlove, 26 Ohio St.2d 178, 
184, 271 N.E.2d 238 (1971) ("Under the circumstances in 
the case at bar, we believe it unjustifiable for the state, on di-
rect examination, to present police mug shots, bearing po-
lice identification numbers, from which a reasonable infer-
ence can be drawn that the defendant, qt some indefinite 
time in the past had had trouble with the law."); State v. 
Wilkinson, 26 Ohio St.2d 185,271 N.E.2d 242 (1971), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 968 (1971 ); State v. Yarbrough, 129 Ohio 
App.3d 437, 440, 717 N.E.2d 1173 (1998) (The prosecution 
may not use a "mug shot" of the defendant in a photo array 
because it "suggested to the jury that [the defendant] had 
prior criminal involvement."); State v. Wills, 120 Ohio App.3d 
320,327, 697 N.E.2d 1072 (1997)("Under the circum-
stances, we find that the single mention of the term 'mug 
shot' did not violate Evid.R. 404(B)."), appeal dismissed, 80 
Ohio St.3d 1409, 684 N.E.2d 703 (1997); State v. Tolbert, 70 
Ohio App.3d 372, 387, 591 N.E.2d 325 (1990)(police identi-
fication numbers were obscured), appeal dismissed, 58 
Ohio St. 3d 701, 569 N.E.2d 504 (1991 ). 
Prior arrests. E.g., State v. Jones, 83 Ohio App.3d 723, 
737,615 N.E.2d 713 (1992)("Generally, reference to prior 
arrests of the defendant is prohibited."). 
Prior indictments. E.g., State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d 
167, 178, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969) (ordinarily the credibility of 
a witness may not be attacked by "proof of indictment"). 
Attacks on the character of the defendant's friends. 
E.g., State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 409, 613 N.E.2d 
203 (1993) ("By arguing explicitly that the bad character of 
Keenan's friends reflected on Keenan's character, when that 
character was wholly irrelevant, the prosecutor ignored the 
fact that ... 'an accused cannot be convicted ... by proving he 
... is a bad person."') (quoting State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio 
St.3d 182, 184, 552 N.E.2d 180 (1990), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 881 (1990)). 
Cross-examination without a good-faith basis. E.g., 
State v. Hunt, 97 Ohio App.3d 372, 375, 646 N.E.2d 889 
(1994) ("At no time did the prosecutor put forth any extrinsic 
evidence to establish this f§ct [taking gasoline to and threat-
ening to blow up a house]."). · 
Profile evidence. E.g., State v. Roquemore, 85 Ohio 
App.3d 448, 620 N.E.2d 110 (1993) (error to permit criminal 
profilist's testimony that impermissibly placed accused's 
character in evidence); State v. Smith, 84 Ohio App.3d 647, 
661, 617 N.E.2d 1160 (1992) (evidence suggested that ac-
cused was a pedophile and this "aspect of his personality 
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was then offered as a propensity from which the jury was 
asked to infer that he had acted in accordance with his 
propensity to commit the crimes alleged"); State v. McMillan, 
69 Ohio App.3d 36, 51, 590 N.E.2d 23 (1990), appeal dis-
missed, 71 Ohio St.3d 1452, 644 N.E.2d 656 (1995) (profile 
of sex abusers improper "group character evidence"). 
Syndrome evidence. E.g., State v. Pargeon, 64 Ohio 
App.3d 679, 681,582 N.E.2d 665 (1991) (In a domestic vio-
lence prosecution, evidence that the accused's wife is a bat-
tered woman "really serves as evidence of the prior bad 
acts ... from which the inference may be drawn that appel-
lant has the propensity to beat his wife and that he beat her 
on this particular occasion. This is precisely the prohibited 
inference that is excluded under Evid. R. 404(B)."). 
ACCUSED'S CHARACTER 
Rule 404(A)(1).recognizes an exception to the general 
prohibition against the admissibility of character evidence. 
In a criminal case, the accused may offer evidence of a per-
tinent trait of his character. Once the accused introduces 
such evidence, the prosecution may cross-examine the de-
fense character witness and offer rebuttal character evi-
dence. 
Prior law 
Rule 404(A)(1) did not change Ohio law. It had long 
been the rule in Ohio that in "a criminal prosecution, until a 
defendant offers evidence of his general good character or 
reputation, the state may not offer testimony of his bad char-
acter or bad reputation." State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 
128, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949) (syllabus, para 3). Accord State 
v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 374 N.E.2d 137 (1978), vacat-
ed on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 (1978); State v. Lytle, 48 
Ohio St.2d 391, 358 N.E.2d 623 (1976), vacated on other 
grounds, 438 U.S. 910 (1978); State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 
66,330 N.E.2d 720 (1975); State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d 
167,249 N.E.2d 912 (1969); State v. Markowitz, 138 Ohio 
St. 106,33 N.E.2d 1 (1941); Saba v. State, 119 Ohio St. 
231, 163 NE 28 (1928); Hamilton v. State, 34 Ohio St. 82 
(1877); Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio St. 55 (1862). 
Limitations 
There are several important limitations on admissibility in 
this context. First, it is the defendant's character at the time 
of the charged offense that is relevant. See Wroe v. State, 
20 Ohio St: 460, 472 (1870) ("evidence ... as to the bad 
character of the defendant subsequent to the commission of 
the offense ought to have been excluded"); 1 McCormick, 
Evidence § 191, at 675 (5th ed. 1999) ("confined to reputa-
tion at approximately the time of the alleged offense"). 
Second, Rule 405(A) limits the methods by which the ac-
cused may introduce character evidence. Under that provi-
sion only opinion and reputation evidence, and not specific 
instances of conduct, may be used. 
Third, in prosecutions for rape and gross sexual imposi-
tion the rape shield statute preempts the rule. 
Personal History 
Typically, an accused introduces evidence of good char-
acter through the testimony of character witnesses. 
Sometimes, however, character evidence or positive as-
pects of the accused's background is brought out by the de-
fense during the examination of the accused or other de-
fense witness. See 1 McCormick, Evidence § 191, at 676 
(5th ed. 1999) ("By relating a personal history supportive of 
, good character, however, the defendant may achieve the 
same result."). · 
This is often a risky tactic. Once the issue is injected into 
the trial in a significant way, the prosecution's right to rebut 
may be triggered. E.g., State v. Robinson, 98 Ohio App.3d 
560 570, 649 N.E.2d 18 (1994) ("Appellant herein intro-
duced evidence on direct examination pertaining to his 
peaceful character via his membership in a beneficent 
branch of the Folks gang .... [T]he trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in allowing the state to cross-examine appel-
lant concerning his juvenile adjudication."). 
Pertinent Trait 
The exception recognized in Rule 404(A)(1) permits the 
accused to introduce only evidence of a "pertinent trait of his 
character." In other words, the character trait 
must be relevant to the crimes charged. 1 McCormick, 
Evidence § 191, at 673-7 4 (5th ed. 1999) ("One charged 
with theft might offer evidence of honesty, while someone 
accused of murder might show that he is peaceable, but not 
vice versa."). For example, in Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio St. 55, 
63 (1862), the Ohio Supreme Court held that "[t]he general 
character which is the proper subject of inquiry should also 
have reference to the nature of the charge against the de-
fendant. Thus, in the present case, the defendant being 
charged with a crime necessarily importing dishonesty, 
called witnesses who gave evidence tending to show a gen-
eral good character for honesty." See also Saba v. State, 
119 Ohio St. 231, 239, 163 NE 28 (1928) ("In a murder 
case, such reputation must relate to his being a peaceable, 
law-abiding citizen."). 
In Booker v. State, 33 App 338 341-42, 169 NE 588 
(1929), an appellate court observed: 
In showing his character, however, [the defendant] is con-
fined to that trait of character that is inconsistent with guilt 
of the offense charged in the indictment. The accused in 
this case attempted to qualify a witness to testify to the 
general reputation of the accused for truth and veracity .... 
Such a reputation might properly be shown in a case of 
perjury, but it is not a trait involved in unlawful possession 
of liquor. He then attempted to qualify a witness as to 
the "general reputation ... for being a peaceable, quiet, 
law-abiding citizen." Objection was made .... The court 
sustained this objection, observing that the crime 
charged was not one of violence, and in this the court 
was right, for it is of course true that bootlegging may be 
both peaceable and quiet. 
Both Saba and Booker permit the introduction of the general 
character trait of being a "law-abiding" person. Such gener-
al character may not be encompassed by Rule 404(A) since 
it is arguably not sufficiently "pertinent" to the crime 
charged, but the federal cases go the other way. E.g., United 
States v. Angelini, 678 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1982) (accused's 
character as law-abiding citizen always admissible); United 
States v. Hewitt, 634 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981)(same). 
This is probably the best interpretation. See1 McCormick, 
Evidence § 191, at 67 4 (5th ed. 1999) ("A few general 
traits, like being law-abiding, seem sufficiently relevant to al-
most any accusation:"). It, however, is a two.:edged sword. 
The prosecution rebuttal evidence for the character trait of 
honesty should be limited to dishonesty; the accused's char-
acter for violence is not relevant. See 1 McCormick, 
Evidence § 191, at 676 (5th ed. 1999) ("[O]nce the defen-
dant gives evidence of pertinent character traits to show that 
he is not guilty, his claim of possession of these traits- but 
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only these traits - is open to rebuttal by cross-examination 
or direct testimony of prosecution witnesses."). But if the ac-
cused introduces evidence of law-abiding character, the 
prosecution may rebut with any evidence of unlawful con-
duct- e.g., convictions for assault or possession of drugs. 
E.g., United States v. Diaz, 961 F.2d 1417, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 
1992) (being prone to criminal activity). 
Jury instructions 
In some cases, evidence of good character offered by the 
accused may have a significant impact. As the United 
States Supreme Court has noted: "The circumstances may 
be such that an established reputation for good character, if 
it is relevant to the issue, would alone create a reasonable 
doubt, although, without it, the other evidence would be 
convincing." Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 366 
(1896). Accord Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 
476 (1948) ("[S]uch testimony alone, in some circum-
stances, may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of 
guilt."). 
Most federal courts hold that the "standing alone-reason-
able doubt" instruction need not be given. E.g., United 
States v. Pujana-Mena, 949 F.2d 24, 28 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1991 ). 
Some courts, however, take a different view- at least under 
certain circumstances. E.g., United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 
1323, 1336-37 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 
(1980); United States v. Lewis, 482 F.2d 632, 637 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) (whenever the accused offers character evidence); 
Oertle v. United States, 370 F.2d 719, 726-27 (1Oth Cir. 
1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967). 
Prosecution Rebuttal 
Once the accused has introduced evidence of a pertinent 
character trait, the prosecution may offer character evidence 
in rebuttal. In State v. Grubb, 111 Ohio App.3d 277, 675 
N.E.2d 1353 (1996), a domestic violence case, the court of 
appeals discussed the requirement that the defendant intro-
duce evidence of a pertinent character trait before the pros-
ecution is permitted to introduce rebuttal evidence: 
[D]efendant did not put his good character in issue in this 
case. Defendant did not testify on direct examination tha 
he is a peaceful person or that he has never assaulted 
any woman, including his former wife. Rather, it was the 
state that elicited that testimony from defendant on 
cross-examination by the use of specific questions de-
signed for just that purpose. The defense objected, un-
successfully, to that questioning. Because defendant 
made no claim at trial regarding his own good character, 
i.e., did not put his character in issue, the testimony of 
defendant's former wife ... was not admissible pursuant tc 
Evid.R. 404(A)(1) to rebut same. The prosecution cannoi 
circumvent the limited nature of the exception provided ir 
Evid.R. 404(A)(1) by putting the character of an accused 
in issue via its own questions, and then present evidencE 
to rebut the answers. ld. at 281. 
In State v. Austin, 115 Ohio App.3d 761, 765, 686 N.E.2d 
324 (1996), the court of appeals held that the defendant 
does not raise the issue of his own character when he intro-
duces evidence of the victim's character: 
Evid.R. 404(A)(I) and (2)are mutually exclusive. When 
an accused injects the issue of the victim's character into 
the case, either by offering character evidence in accor-
dance with Evid.R. 405 or by coupling self-defense with 
evidence of first aggression of the victim in a homicide 
case, the accused does not by virtue of these elections 
open the issue of the accused's own character. The 
issue of the accused's character is only introduced in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Evid.R. 404(A)(1) when 
the accused offerspositive character evidence as pre-
scribed by the procedures delineated in Evid.R. 405. 
The same limitations that apply to character evidence of-
fered by the defense apply to the prosecution. First, the 
character trait that is the subject of rebuttal must be "perti-
nent" to the crime charged. E.g., State v. Manning, 74 Ohio 
App.3d 19, 28, 598 N.E.2d 25 (1991) (prosecution permitted 
to call rebuttal witnesses after defense witnesses testified 
that the accused was quiet, timid, and nonviolent), cert. de-
nied, 504 U.S. 918 (1992). For example, in a theft case the 
defense character witnesses should testify about the defen-
dant's character for honesty. Similarly, the rebuttal witness-
es' testimony should be limited to the same trait, i.e., dis-
honesty. See 1 McCormick, Evidence § 191, at 676 (5th ed. 
1999) ("[O]nce the defendant gives evidence of pertinent 
character traits to show that he is not guilty, his claim of pos-
session of these traits- but only these traits - is open to re-
buttal by cross-examination or direct testimony of prosecu-
tion witnesses."). 
Second, Rule 405(A) specifies the methods of proof 
which are available for the presentation of rebuttal evidence. 
Thus, the prosecution, like the accused, is limited to opinion 
or reputation evidence. ' 
Cross-Examination 
The prosecution also may challenge defense character 
evidence through cross-examination of the character wit-
nesses. Once the accused calls a defense character wit-
ness, Rule 405(A) permits the use of specific acts during 
crosscexamination. Thus, a reputation or opinion witness 
may be asked on cross~examination "if she has heard" or "if 
she knows" of specific acts that reflect upon the character 
trait addressed by that witness. The cross-examiner, how-
ever, "must take the witness's answer"; that is, extrinsic evi-
dence of the specific act is not admissible. In State v. Elliott, 
25 Ohio St.2d 249,267 N.E.2d 806 (1971)(syllabus, para. 
2), vacated, 408 U.S. 939 (1972), the Ohio Supreme Court 
explained: 
A character witness may be cross-examined as to the ex-
istence of reports of particular acts, vices, or associa-
tions of the person concerning whom he has testified 
which are inconsistent with the reputation attributed to 
him by the witness - not to establish the truth of the 
facts, but to test the credibility of the witness, and to as-
cer~ain what weight or value is to be given his testimony. 
Such inconsistent testimony tends to show either that the 
witness is unfamiliar with the reputation concerning 
which he has testified, or that his standards of what con-
stitutes good repute are unsound. 
The Court cited Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 
(1948), the leading case on this subject. Michelson, 
charged with bribery of an IRS agent, called witnesses who 
testified about his good character for truth and honesty. The 
United States Supreme Court upheld the prosecutor's right 
to ask these witnesses whether they "had heard" about 
Michelson's 20-year-oldeonviction for a trademark violation 
and 27 -year-old arrest for receiving stolen property. 
The justification for this type of examination is that the 
prosecution has the right to test the basis for the character 
witness's testimony. A character witness who is unaware of 
a defendant's prior arrests and convictions would not ap-
pear to be very informed about the defendant's reputation. 
ld. at 483 ("The inquiry as to an arrest is permissible also 
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because the prosecution has a right to test the qualifications 
of the witness to bespeak the community opinion. If one 
never heard the speculations and rumors in which even 
one's friends indulge upon his arrest, the jury may doubt 
whether he is capable of giving any very reliable conclu-
sions as to his reputation."). 
If the witness is knows of negative information but ig-
nores it, the witness's standards for assessing reputation 
are drawn into question. In Michelson Justice Jackson used 
the following illustration: 
A classic example in the books is a character witness in a 
trial for muroer. She testified she grew up with defendant, 
knew his reputation for peace and quiet, and that it was 
good. On cross-examination she was asked if she had· 
heard that the defendant had shot anybody and, if so, 
how many. She answered, 'Three or four," and gave the 
names of two but could not recall the names of the oth-
ers. She still insisted, however, that he was of "good 
character:' The jury seems to have valued her informa-
tion more highly than her judgment [and convicted]." ld at 
479 ri. 16. 
Cases decided under the Rules are in accord. In State v. 
Jackson, 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 39,565 N.E.2d 549 (1991), cert 
denied, 502 U.S. 835 86 (1991), a defense character wit-
ness testified in the penalty phase of a capital case that the 
defendant was peaceful. On cross-examination, the prose-
cutor asked if the witness knew that the accused had as-
saulted and robbed three older women in 1983 and assault-
ed another woman in 1985. The Ohio Supreme Court up-
held this line of questioning: "[The witness's] characteriza-
tion of Jackson as sweet, gentle, and nonviolent opened the 
door for cross-examination about specific instances of con-
duct sharply at variance with her opinion testimony." See 
also State v. Miller, 122 Ohio App.3d 111, 122, 701 N.E.2d 
390 1997) ("The fact that Miller was arrested for a drug-re-
lated offense could affect his reputation as a person who 
does not deal narcotics. This instance of Miller's miscon-
duct was relevant to the testimony of the character witness, 
and was admissible to impeach [that witness's] statement 
that Miller had a reputation as a person who does not deal 
narcotics."); State v. Collins, 97 Ohio App.3d 438, 448-50, 
646 N.E.2d 1142 {1994){After a defense character witness 
testified that the accused did not fight and was not a trouble-
maker, prosecutor cross-examined on prior arrests for carry-
ing a concealed weapon, resisting arrest, and two misde-
meanor theft convictions.), appeal dismissed, 70 Ohio St.3d 
1440, 638 N.E.2d 1044 (1994). 
Good faith basis-in-fact requirement. The risk that the 
jury will use this information for an improper purpose- to 
show character- is great notwithstanding a limiting instruc-
tion. Moreover, the practice possesses the potential for 
abuse. As Wigmore observed: 'This method of inquiry or 
cross-examination is frequently resorted to by counsel for 
the very purpose of injuring by indirection a character which 
they are forbidden directly to attack in that way; they rely 
upon the mere putting of the question (not caring that it is 
answered negatively) to convey their covert insinuation." 3A 
Wigmore, Evidence§ 988, at 921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
Consequently, courts have required that this type of 
cross-examination be conducted in good faith, i.e., that the 
prosecutor have a basis in fact for asking the question. See 
1 McCormick, Evidence § 191, at 677 (5th ed. 1999) ("This 
power of the cross-examiner to reopen old wounds is re-
plete with possibilities for prejudice .... As a precondition to 
cros1-examination about other wrongs, the prosecutor 
should reveal, outside the heqring of the jury, what his basis 
is for believing in the rumors or incidents he proposes to ask 
about. The court should then determine whether there is a 
substantial basis for the cross-examination."). 
The Michelson Court recognized that this type of cross-
examination placed a "heavy responsibility on trial courts to 
protect the practice from any misuse." Michelson v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 469, 480 (1948). The Court went on to 
point out that the trial judge in that case took pains to ascer-
tain, out of presence of the jury, that the target of the ques-
tion was an actual event, which would probably result in 
some comment among acquaintances if not injury to defen-
dant's reputation. He satisfied himself that counsel was not 
merely taking a random shot at a reputation imprudently ex-
posed or asking a groundless question to waft an unwar-
ranted innuendo into the jury box. ld. at 481. Similarly, the 
Ohio Supreme Court in Elliott remarked: "If the defendant 
had never been convicted of a felonious assault, such ques-
tion by the prosecutor, being made in bad faith, would be 
the predicate for error." State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 
253, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 939 (1972). 
See also State v. Hart, 72 Ohio App.3d 92, 98, 593 N.E.2d 
463 (1991), appeal dismissed, 61 Ohio St.3d 1418,574 
N.E.2d 1089 (1 991) (recognizing the good faith require-
ment). 
Pertinent trait. Only acts which bear some relationship 
to the particular character trait offered by the defendant can 
properly be raised on cross-examination. For example, if 
the character witness testifies about the defendant's charac-
ter for honesty, the witness cannot be cross-examined about 
violent acts. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 
483-84 (1948); State v. Krout, 6 Ohio App.3d 5, 7, 451 
N.E.2d 515 (1982) (witnesses who testify about truthful 
character cannot be cross-examined about drug crimes). 
Remoteness. Acts which are too remote are not the 
proper subject of cross-examination. The question concern-
ing the 27-year-old arrest was permitted in Michelson only 
because "two of [the character] witnesses dated their ac-
quaintance with defendant as commencing thirty years be-
fore the trial." Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 484 
(1948). 
Effect of current charge. Cross-examination of defense 
character witnesses concerning the effect of the current 
charges on the defendant's reputation or on the witness's 
opinion are improper because the question asks the witness 
"to indulge in a hypothetical assumption of the defendant's 
guilt." 1 McCormick, Evidence§ 191, at 677 (5th ed. 1 999). 
See also United States v. Mason, 993 F.2d 406, 409 (4th 
Cir. 1 993) (question improper; citing numerous cases). 
VICTIM'S CHARACTER 
A second exception to the general prohibition against the 
admissibility of character evidence is recognized in Rule 
404(A)(2), which permits an accused to present evidence of 
a pertinent character trait of the alleged victim of the 
charged offense; +McCormick; Evidence § 193, at 681 (5th 
ed. 1 999) ("There is, however, a risk of a different form of 
prejudice. Learning of the victim's bad character could lead 
the jury to think that the victim merely 'got what he de-
served' and to acquit for that reason."). 
Once the accused has introduced such evidence, the 
prosecution may offer rebuttal evidence. The prosecution, 
however, is prohibited from introducing evidence of the vic-
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tim's character until the defense "opens the door." See State 
v. White, 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 150-51, 239 N.E.2d 65 (1968); 
Reed v. State, 98 Ohio St. 279, 120 NE 701(1918); 
Upthegrove v. State, 37 Ohio St. 662 (1882); State v. 
Schmidt, 65 Ohio App.2d 239,417 N.E.2d 1264 (1979). 
The Ohio Supreme Court has noted. that character evi-
dence about a victim "is admissible when itrelates directly 
to the circumstances of the crime and is not offered to elicit 
sympathy from the jury." State v. Allen, 73 Ohio St.3d 626 
633, 653 N.E.2d 675 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1178 
(1 996). In Allen, the Court upheld the admission of what 
might be characterized as evidence of the victim's good 
character in the prosecution's case-in-chief because this ev-
idence was relevant to the circumstances of the crime: 
Testimony that [the victim] did not drink or smoke was 
relevant, because a wine bottle and cigarette butts were 
found in her house. Evidence showing [the victim's] reli-
gious devotion was also relevant for noncharacter pur-
poses. The "praying hands" design on the wallet identi-
fied it as hers. Her dedication to helping sinners 
"straighten ... out" explained her friendship with [the de-
fendant]. Her habit of baking things for people was rele-
vant to her spending habits .... [The victim's] friend ... 
testified that [the victim] rose early for morning devotions. 
This evidence of [the victim's] habit was relevant because 
[she] had not put out her garbage on the morning [her 
body was discovered]. [The victim's] habitual early rising 
explained why this nonoccurrence was unusual, narrow-
ing the time of death. ld. at 633-34. 
See also State v. Lundgren, 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 486, 653 
N.E.2d 304 (1995) ("Lundgren objected to the admission of 
two diplomas, an engraved silver dish, a charm necklace, 
and a family photograph. He argues that this evidence con-
stituted improper victim character evidence. These items 
were introduced to support the identity of the bodies buried 
in the barn."), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1178 (1996). 
SELF-DEFENSE 
At common law, a victim's character was considered rele-
vant in two types of prosecutions: {1) on the issue of self-
defense in homicide and assault cases, and (2) on the issue 
of consent in rape cases. In the latter cases, the rape-shield 
statute rather than Rule 404 controls. The statute is dis-
cussed infra. Consequently, Rule 404(A)(2) will be applica-
ble principally on the self-defense issue. 
First aggressor issue 
In a homicide or assault case, the defendant may intro-
duce evidence of the victim's violent and aggressive charac-
ter to show that the victim was the first aggressor, thereby 
establishing one element of self-defense. See State v. 
Hirsch, 129 Ohio App.3d 294,717 N.E.2d 789 {1998), ap-
peal dismissed, 84 Ohio St.3d 1436, 702 N.E.2d 1213 
(1 998). In Hirsch, the prosecution introduced evidence that 
the victim got along with everyone and had no enemies. 
The court stated: "Pursuant to Evid.R. 404(A), evidence of 
the character of the victim as a quiet and peaceable person 
is inadmissible except to rebut a defense claim that the vic-
tim was the first aggressor .... There was no such claim in 
this case, and w_e therefore conclude that the trial court 
erred in admitting evidence regarding the victim's character." 
ld. at 311. 
Methods of Proof 
Rule 405(A) limits the methods of proof that the accused 
and the prosecution may use to show or to rebut the charac-
ter of a victim; only reputation or opinion evidence is permit-
ted. E.g., State v. Cuttiford, 93 Ohio App.3d 546, 554, 639 
N.E.2d 472 (1994) ("In conformity with Evid. R. 405(A) 
405(A), the trial court permitted two witnesses called by de-
fendant to testify that Banks had a reputation for violent be-
havior .... [H]owever, the trial court refused to permit wit-
nesses other than defendant to testify regarding specific in-
stances of Banks's violent behavior."). 
Homicide cases 
There is a special rule in homicide prosecutions. Any evi-
dence that the victim was the first aggressor in a homicide 
(but not an assault) case triggers the prosecutidn's right to 
introduce rebuttal evidence of the victim's peaceful charac-
ter. For example, if the accused testifies that the victim was 
the first aggressor, but does not introduce character evi-
dence on this issue, the prosecution may nevertheless intro-
duce evidence of the victim's peaceful character in rebuttal 
See 1 McCormick, Evidence§ 193, at 681 (5th ed. 1999) 
("Since a dead victim cannot attest to his peaceable behav-
ior during the fatal encounter, the last clause of Rule 
404(a}(2) provides that whenever the accused claims self-
defense and offers any type of evidence that the deceased 
was the first aggressor, the government may reply with evi-
dence of the peaceable character of the deceased."}. 
Accused's mental state: communicated character 
There is a second use of the victim's violent character 
that is also relevant to self-defense; that is, to show its effect 
on the accused's state of mind. E.g., State v. Baker, 88 Ohio 
App.3d 204, 208, 623 N.E.2d 672 (1993) ("Whether evi-
dence concerning the victim is admissible to prove self-de-
fense depends upon the type of evidence being offered. 
Typically, such evidence falls into two general categories: (1) 
testimony~concerning th1:3 victim offered to demonstrate the 
defendant's state of mind at the time of the incident, and (2) 
testimony about the victim's character offered to prove that 
the victim was more likely the aggressor."). 
Because this use does not involve character-as-proof-of-
conduct, neither Rule 404(A) nor Rule 405(A), limiting the 
methods of proof to reputation and opinion, apply. Instead, 
this issue falls under the general relevance rules, Rules 401 
and 403. 
This use obviously depends on whether the accused 
knew of the victim's character. See State v. Austin; 115 
Ohio App.3d 761, 764, 686 N.E.2d 324 (1996) ("A defen-
dant arguing self-defense may testify about specific in-
stances of the victim's prior conduct in order to establish the 
defendant's state of mind .... 'These events are admissible in 
evidence, not because they establish something about the 
victim's character, but because they tend to show why the 
defendant believed the victim would kill or severely injure 
him."') (quoting State v. Carlson, 31 Ohio App.3d 72, 508 
N.E.2d 999 (1986); State v. Marsh, 71 Ohio App.3d 64 70, 
593 N.E.2d 35 (1990)("[A] defendant may not introduce evi-
dence of a victim's prior specific instances of conduct to 
show the defendant's state of mind unless the defendant 
had knowledge of that conduct. If the defendant was not 
aware of the victim's prior conduct, that conduct is irrelevant 
as itcould not bave affectecj the defendant's state of mind at 
the time of the incident."}, appeal dismissed, 60 Ohio St.3d 
708, 573 N.E.2d 667 (1991). This includes the accused's 
knowledge of the victim's reputation or specific acts of vio-
lence; this type of evidence is not hearsay because it is not 
offered for the truth (i.e., that the victim was a violent per-
son) but rather to show its effect on the accused. 
In contrast, if character evidence is introduced to show 
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that the victim acted in conformity with that character and 
was therefore the first aggressor, the accusecl's awareness 
of the victim's character is not relevant. See 1 A Wigmore, 
Evidence § 63, at 1369 (Tillers rev. 1983) ("[The] additional 
element of communication is unnecessary, for the question 
is what the deceased probably did, not what the accused 
probably thought the deceased was going to do. The inquiry 
is one of objective occurrence, not of subjective belief."). 
RAPE SHIED LAW 
The exceptions for evidence of the accused's character 
and the victim's character are both subject to the following 
limitation: "however, in prosecutions for rape, gross sexual 
imposition, and prostitution, the exceptions provided by 
statute enacted by the General Assembly are applicable." 
Evid. R. 404(A)(1} & (2). This passage refers to the "rape 
shield law" (R.C. 2907.02(D)(rape); R.C. 2907.05(D)(gross 
sexual imposition) and a statute on prostitution. [R.C. 
2907.26 (prostitution). 
The reference to statutes enacted by the General 
Assembly was added in 1980, the year in which the Rules 
took effect. This reference did not appear in the earlier pro-
posals that were rejected by the General Assembly. See 51 
Ohio Bar 186 (1978); 50 Ohio Bar 236 (1977). These 
statutes were considered "substantive" provisions and thus 
cot.Jid not be superseded by the Rules. Giannelli, The 
Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The General Assembly, 
Evidence, and Rulemaking, 29 CWRU L Rev 16, 53-55 
(1978}. 
Under the common law, an accused charged with rape 
was permitted to introduce evidence of the victim's unchaste 
character as circumstantial evidence of consent. E.g., 
McDermott v. State, 13 Ohio St. 332 (1862); McCombs v. 
State, 8 Ohio St. 643 (1858). This rule rested on the as-
sumption that a woman who has consented to premarital or 
extramarital intercourse was more likely to consent than a 
woman who had not consented to such past intercourse. In 
recent years, this dubious assumption, along with other as-
pects of rape prosecutions, has been severely criticized. 
Most states have responded by enacting "shield" laws which 
limit the admissibility of evidence of the victim's character. 
See 1 McCormick, Evidence § 193, at 682 (5th ed. 1999} 
("In the 1970s, however, nearly all jurisdictions enacted 
'rape shield' laws .... "). 
The Ohio shield law applies only in rape and gross sexu-
al imposition prosecutions. See State v. Cotton, 113 Ohio 
App.3d 125, 134, 680 N. E.2d 657 (1996) ("the rape-shield 
statutes apply only to ... rape and gross sexual imposition" 
and not to felonious sexual penetration); State v. Black, 85 
Ohio App.3d 771, 778, 621 N.E.2d 484 (1993)("The charges 
against the defendant consist of three counts of contributing 
to the unruliness of a minor with no accompanying charge 
of rape. Therefore, the rape-shield doctrine does not 
apply."), appeal dismissed, 67 Ohio St.3d 1451, 619 N.E.2d 
420 (1993). 
The law is designed to protect several interests: 
First, by guarding the complainant's sexual privacy and 
protecting her from undue harassment, the law discour-
ages the tendency in rape cases to try the victim rather 
than the defendant. In line with this, the law may encour-
age the reporting of rape, thus aiding crime prevention. 
Finally, by excluding evidence that is unduly inflammatory 
and prejudicial, while being only marginally probative, the 
statute is intended to aid in the truth-finding process. 
_,State v. Gi=!rdner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14, 17-18,391 N.E.2d 
337 (1979). 
The rape shield law excludes reputation, opinion, and spe-
cific acts evidence concerning the victim's past sexual histo-
ry. 
Exceptions 
There are several exceptions. The first involves the (1) 
the origin of semen, p"regnancy, or disease. In State v. 
Trummer, 114 Ohio App.3d 456, 683 N.E.2d 392 (1996), ap-
peal dismissed, 78 Ohio St.3d 1409, 675 N.E.2d 1249 
(1997), the court of appeals held that expert testimony of-
fered by the defendant to the effect that the defendant could 
not have been the source of semen found on the victim's 
clothing was inadmissible because the state offered no evi-
dence on the semen. The court noted that the defendant 
had admitted that he had sexual relations with the victim on 
the night in question, but that the victim had consented. The 
court concluded that ''there was no fact at issue relative to 
the semen in question and, very obviously, the proffered evi-
dence was to be presented simply to impeach the credibility 
of the victim." ld. at 466. 
The second involves the victim's past sexual activity with 
the accused. 
Other Requirements 
The statute differs in two respects from the general treat-
ment of character evidence under the Rules of Evidence. 
First, the statute allows consideration of character evidence 
only insofar as it relates to sexual activity between the victim 
and defendant; Rule 404(A)(2) contains no such limitation. 
Second, the statute permits specific instances of conduct to 
be introduced; Rule 405(A) limits the methods of proof to 
reputation and opinion evidence. 
In addition, this evidence is admissible only to the extent 
that a material fact is at issue and only if its inflammatory or 
prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value. See 
State v. Cotton, 113 Ohio App.3d 125, 131, 680 N.E.2d 657 
(1996) ("Unlike the test provided in Evid.R. 403, requiring 
that evidence must be excluded where its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, R.C. 
2907.02(0) and 2907.05(0) provide simply for weighing the 
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial ef-
fect."). 
Procedure 
The statute also provides for a pretrial in-chambers reso-
lution of these issues. R.C. 2907.02(E) (court shall resolve 
admissibility issue in a hearing in chambers). See State v. 
Cotton, 113 Ohio App.3d 125 130, 680 N.E.2d 657 (1996) 
("These statutes clearly dictate that a trial court shall re-
solve the admissibility of testimony involving prior sexual 
acts of the defendant in chambers .... [A] sidebar confer-
ence does not satisfy the requirements of an in-chambers 
hearing."). 
Prior false accusations 
In State v. Boggs, 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 421, 588 N.E.2d 
813 (1992), the trial judge, based on the rape shield law, 
precluded the defense from cross-examining the alleged 
victim about a prior false accusation of rape. The Ohio 
Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that "[f]alse accusations, 
where no sexual activity is involved, do not fall within the 
rape shield statute." A rape accusation could be false in two 
different ways: (1) where there has never been sexual inter-
course, and (2) where there has been intercourse but it was 
consensual. 
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This line of questioning involves impeachment by prior 
acts that reflect untruthful character, a credibility issue. Rule 
608(8), which governs this issue, permits inquiry on cross-
examination but prohibits extrinsic evidence. The defense, 
of course, has to establish that the accusation was false. 
If, however, the prior accusation involved sexual activity, 
the rape shield law prohibits this line of questioning. The 
Court summarized its holding as follows: 
[8]efore cross-examination of a rape victim as to prior 
false rape accusations may proceed, the trial judge shall 
hold an in camera hearing to ascertain whether such tes-
timony involves sexual activity and thus is inadmissible 
under R.C. 2907.02(0), or is totally unfounded and ad-
missible for impeachment of the victim. It is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court, pursuant to Evid. R. 
608(8), whether to allow such cross-examination.ld. at 
424. 
See also State v. Black, 85 Ohio App.3d 771, 778, 621 
N.E.2d 484 (1993) ("[8]ecause prior false accusations of 
rape do not constitute sexual activity of the victim, the rape-
shield doctrine does not exclude such evidence."), appeal 
dismissed, 67 Ohio St.3d 1451,619 N.E.2d 420 (1993). 
Accused's Conduct 
The rape shield law also applies to past sexual activity of 
the accused. The statute excludes reputation, opinion, or 
specific acts evidence concerning the accused's past sexual 
history unless it involves evidence of (1) the origin of 
semen, pregnancy, or disease, (2) the accused's past sexu-
al activity with the victim, or (3) other-acts evidence admissi-
ble under R.C. 2945.59. Further, this evidence is admissible 
only to the extent it relates to a material issue and "its in-
flammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its pro-
bative value." R.C. 2907.02(0) (rape); R.C. 2907.05(0) 
(gross sexual imposition). 
Unlike Rule 403, this weighing process does not include 
the term "substantially." See State v. Clemons, 94 Ohio 
App.3d 701, 711, 641 N.E.2d 778 (1994) (accused's "prob-
lem" with masturbation improperly admitted in rape case; 
"The connection is simply too tenuous."), appeal dismissed, 
70 Ohio St.3d 1454,639 N.E.2d 793 (1994). Moreover, a 
defendant who testifies that he had "never in my entire life 
ever had sex with any child" waives the statutory limitations 
regarding specific instances of sexual activity. State v. 
Banks, 71 Ohio App.3d 214, 220, 593 N.E.2d 346 (1991 ). 
Waiver 
Ohio courts have recognized that the protections of the 
statute may be waived. If, for example, the victim asserted 
that she had never engaged in sexual activity, the defense 
may be permitted to present evidence of the victim's sexual 
activity with persons other than the defendant. See State v. 
Malin, 1999 WL 1775, No. 97CA006898 (9th Oist. Ct. App., 
Lorain, 12-30-98). In that case, the victim was a mentally 
retarded 25-year-old woman. Her mother testified about her 
limited grasp of sexual matters and her disinterest in sex. 
The court of appeals held that the mother's testimony did 
not "constitute a waiver of the protections of the rape shield 
statute" because the mother "did not expressly state that her 
daughter had never engaged in sexual activity, nor did she 
state that her daughter had no knowledge of what would 
constitute sexual activity." ld. 
Sanctions 
In Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S.145 (1991), the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that the exclusion of defense 
evidence _for failingto comply with the notice provision of a 
rape shield statute was not per se unconstitutional. The 
Court indicated, however, that exclusion in a particular case 
may be unconstitutional. 
Constitutionality 
Because rape shield laws preclude evidence that is ar-
guably exculpatory, their constitutionality has been ques-
tioned. See generally Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the 
State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second 
Decade, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 763 (1986); Tanford & Bocchino, 
Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 544 (1980); Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's 
Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1 (1977). 
Two United States Supreme Court cases, Davis v. 
Alaska, 415l).S. 308 (1974), and Chambers v. Mississippi, 
410 U.S. 284 (1973), are usually cited in support of the de-
fendant's right to introduce evidence of the victim's charac-
ter, at least in some.circumstances. Congress recognized 
the force of the constitutional argument in enacting a federal 
shield law. Federal Rule 412 recognizes an exception 
where exclosion ''would violate the constitutional rights of 
the defendant." 
In Davis the Court held that a state statute excluding evi-
dence of a juvenile adjudication (a type of shield law) violat-
ed the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. 
In Chambers the Court held that the application of state evi-
dentiary rules that excluded critical and reliable defense evi-
dence violated due process. Nevertheless, the shield laws 
have survived constitutional attacks, at least when the at-
tacks are facial. See 1 McCormick, Evidence § 193, at 685 
(5th ed. 1999). Simply put, evidence of past sexual history 
lack~_pr()IJCitl\f~\fal_ue inmost cases. Individual cases, how-
ever, are a different matter. For example, in State v. Jalo, 27 
Ore. App. 845, 850-51, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976), the defendant 
denied that he had sexual intercourse with the complainant. 
The appellate court held it error to exclude evidence that the 
complainant had had sexual relations with the defendant's 
son and others, which facts had become known to the de-
fendant and he had informed the complainant that he would 
notifY her parents. Application of the shield law in this case 
precluded the defendant from establishing the complainant's 
motive to accuse him falsely, the core of his defense. 
In State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14, 19 n. 5, 391 
N.E.2d 337 (1979), the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Ohio statute as applied in that case, 
leaving open, however, the possibility that different facts 
might produce a different result. 
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In State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St.3d 33, 487 N.E.2d 560 
(1986), the Court again considered the issue. The alleged 
victim testified that she was "gay" and thus would not have 
consented to sex with a man. The defendant claimed con-
sent and attempted to call a witness to testify about the vic-
tim's reputation as a prostitute and another male who 
claimed to have had sex with the victim. The trial court ex-
cluded, based on the shield law, the testimony of both wit-
nesses. The Supreme Court agreed that the evidence was 
inadmissible under the rape shield law, but also found that 
"the rape shield law as applied in this case violates ap-
pellee's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation." ld. at 36. 
In In re Michael;n9 Ohio Ap-p.3d 112, 118, 694 N.E.2d 
538 (1997), the court of appeals noted that "there may be 
circumstances in which a defendant's confrontation right re-
quires that evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct 
be admitted, notwithstanding the fact that the evidence 
would otherwise be excluded by the rape shield law." The 
court found in Michael that evidence that the child victim 
had been abused before in the same manner he alleged he 
was abused by the defendant was "essential" to the defense 
that the defendant was innocent and that the prior abuse ex-
plained the child's sexual knowledge. ld. 
WITNESS'S CHARACTER 
The third exception to the general prohibition against the 
use of character evidence concerns a witness's character. 
This exception, recognized in Rule 404(A)(3), involves the 
use of character evidence for impeachment and is therefore 
limited to the character trait of untruthfulness. Unlike the 
other exceptions of Rule 404(A), this exception applies in 
civil as well as in criminal cases. It applies whenever a wit-
ness, including a criminal defendant, takes the stand to tes-
tify. 
Rule 404(A)(3) does not specify the conditions under 
which character evidence may be used to impeach a wit-
ness. Instead, the rule contains a cross-reference to the 
rules regulating the impeachment use of character evi-
dence. Rule 608(A) permits the use of reputation and opin-
ion evidence to impeach for untruthful character. Rule 
608(B) permits the use of specific instances of conduct that 
did not result in conviction to be used for impeachment 
under specified circumstances. Rule 609 governs impeach-
ment by evidence of prior convictions. 
